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Promoting Energy 
Partnership in Beijing and 
Washing ton 
A l t h o u g h  China and the United States do not rely on one another 
for energy supplies, energy security has ironically become a necessary agenda 
item in Chinese-U.S. relations. As the world’s second-largest and largest con- 
sumers of oil, respectively, China and the United States are becoming more 
sensitive to each other’s pursuit of energy sources from other countries. Likely 
because the Chinese and U.S. economies have absorbed the impact of the 
most recent global oil price spikes and still enjoyed steady growth, energy rc- 
mains mostly an issue for dialogue rather than a cause for confrontation. Yet, 
the prospects for energy to become a cause for more serious clashes are high, 
with demand in both countries set to rise continuously, even rapidly. 
In an age of global interdependence, Beijing and Washington should seek 
to ameliorate differences on tense energy issues. Although dialogucs on energy 
security conceptualizations and policy preferences are positive, they must 
move beyond talking toward a true partnership that can confront the common 
challenges they face as importers. 
A New Source of Tension 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States was the sole 
source of supply of kerosene and other oil products to the Chinese market. 
Those market ties came to an end in the late 1930s, when World War I1 
made it impossible for distribution in China to continue. Then, from 1950 to 
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the Nixon-Kissinger detente in 1971, China was placed under a comprehen- 
sive U.S. economic embargo. The  two countries did not rcconncct in energy 
supply until a formal diplomatic relationship was established in 1979. In  the 
1980s, the United States became the second-largest export destination behind 
Japan for Chinese crude oil. By 1993, the year China became a net importer of 
refined oil, crude oil exports to  the United States accounted for 14 percent of 
total Chinese oil exports, although this contribution to  total U.S. oil imports 
was negligible.' 
Since 1980, China has allowed international oil companies to  participate in 
developing its offshore oil and gas reserves and to conduct oil-related business 
on land. Chinese law, however, requires that international oil companies enter 
into joint ventures on  Chinese territory with Chinese counterparts. Because 
the Chinese oil industry is state owned and operates monopolistically, such 
joint ventures have been limited, especially in distribution. 
Moreover, China's oil production peaked in volume in 1985, and domestic 
consumption began to  increase rapidly. The  significance of oil as an export 
item for earning hard currency began to Coincidentally, world oil 
prices were decreasing in the mid- 1980s. International oil companies that had 
established dominance in other regions of the world did not find it necessary 
to establish a stronger presence in China. Thus, contrary to U.S. expectations 
in the early 1980s for China to be a major energy s o ~ r c e , ~  the United States 
instead secured its supplies from other states. 
The  absence of meaningful trade and investment ties in the energy sector 
is a striking phenomenon. Since 1979, U.S. business interests in trade and in- 
vestment in China have generally served as a key lobbying force, successfully 
petitioning Beijing and Washington to  compromise when differences threaten 
fragile diplomatic ties. Yet, oil and other forms of energy have hardly been 
represented in that business lobby because of a lack of major trade and invest- 
ment in those sectors. The political establishments in Beijing and Washington 
have therefore not been as educated on the importance of managing bilateral 
ties from the perspective of the energy sector. This lack of education facilitates 
alarmist views over energy security on both sides. 
Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Intent: The Malevolent Hegemon? 
Although China became a net importer of oil products in 1993 and of crude 
oil in 1996, energy as a national security matter did not begin to feature prom- 
inently in China's political discourse until several years later. The most power- 
ful trigger was the dramatic rise in China's oil imports in 2000: 72 million tons 
(roughly 25 percent of total Chinese consumption) , compared with 37 million 
tons in 1999. The  tripling of world oil prices from January 1999 to  January 
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tions in the late 1990s were permeated with 
several incidents pointing to a pattern of 
strategic volatility: U.S. opposition to Chi- 
na’s bid to  host the  2000 Olympic Games 
leader Lee Teng-hui and the ensuing cri- 
in 1993, granting a visa to  then-Taiwanese 
The prospects for 
energy to become a 
cause for more serious 
clashes are high. 
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Chinese freighter carrying what the CIA incorrectly claimed to be cheniical 
weapons materials to Iran, leading to Chinese assessments of US. meddling in 
China’s economic ties in the Persian Gulf.7 That  unfortunate episode in Chi- 
nese-U.S. relations, however, was related to nonproliferation rather than the 
Chinese acquisition of Middle Eastern oil. 
The  argument that the U.S. government conspires to manipulate world oil 
prices fails to consider the implications of the United States’ place as the larg- 
est importer of oil in the world. It would be self-destructive for the U.S. gov- 
ernment to  support a rise in world oil prices, as oil is openly sold to whomever 
is willing to  pay the highest bidding price. If the price were manipulated in any 
direction, any damage to  China would also hurt the United States. 
Moreover, China  benefits from the  freedom of commercial navigation 
through the Strait of Hormuz, which since the late 1970s has been protected 
by the US.  naval presence in the region. Chinese analysts who complain about 
U.S. hegemony in  the Middle East fail t o  take note of their own country’s 
need for security in  maritime transport. It is certainly in China’s interest for 
movement of oil through the Strait of Hormuz to continue to be safeguarded 
against sabotage. 
Such  alarmist Chinese views have serious energy policy implications, 
prompting Beijing to  take measures to minimize its exposure to volatilities 
in international energy trade markets. In response to international concerns 
about Chinese demand posing a threat t o  global oil supply, for example, the 
Chinese government decided to  continue to  support extraction of coal in Chi- 
na despite coal extraction’s serious social and environmental consequences. In 
addition to being a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, coal mining 
in China led to some 6,000 deaths in 2005.8 Despite coal’s abundance in the 
country, Beijing should instead be offering more robust political and financial 
support for developing alternative and cleaner sources of energy supply. 
China has also decided to support energy investment abroad wherever access 
is possible, including in countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia that most major 
international energy corporations avoid due to serious political and social risks. 
Chinese energy operations in these and other countries do  levy heavy costs on 
China’s international diplomacy. Still, under the assumption that major powers 
such as the United States are working to deny China the energy supply it needs 
to grow’ it is easier to justify securing supplies wherever possible before access to 
foreign sources of supply becomes even more difficult. 
U.S. Perceptions of Chinese Intent: Energy as the Trojan Horse? 
A popular view among US. analysts is to see China’s pursuit of foreign energy 
supply as an  integral part of China’s grand strategy to build up the country’s 
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to identify the relationship between Chinese 
government diplomacy and its oil companies’ 
decisions to  pursue energy projects in other 
countries, more popularly known as China’s 
zoir chuqir, or “going out” (of the country for 
energy), campaign. A n  accurate and authori- 
tative assessment of China’s energy and re- 
The absence of 
meaningful bilateral 
trade and investment 
energy-sector ties is 
striking. 
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a key consideration for Chinese oil importers is the technological match be- 
tween the Chinese oil refining facilities and the type and blend of oil that  is 
available. China is not necessarily purposefully seeking out oil exporters with 
which the United States takes issue. If there is a technological match between 
available refining facilities in China and supply from a foreign country that 
the United States finds questionable, China has no choice but to live with 
international complaints or protests. What  appears to be a matter of willful 
disregard of US.  concerns may instead be a necessary evil given China’s need 
to feed its tremendous growth. 
China is often also identified as the key factor behind spikes in oil prices in 
recent years and as a member of a new %xis of oil’’ posing a direct challenge to 
the United States’ search for energy ~ecuri ty . ’~ Chinese officials try tirelessly to 
convince international audiences that China is not the cause of rising global 
oil prices. Quite the contrary, China is a positive force in safeguarding energy 
security on  a global scale. China continues to maximize reliance on domestic 
sources of energy supply to meet its overall demand. It pursues its foreign 
sources of supply through peaceful means, as opposed to  the \Vest’s practices 
of colonialism during their own history of industrialization. China also niakes 
conservation a key component in energy cooperation with advanced industrial 
countries, the United States incl i~ded.’~ 
In the wake of the politically contentious competition between the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Chevron Corporation for 
acquiring California-based Unocal, i t  is tempting for Congress and the Bush 
administration to  misinterpret China’s geostrategic intent in its overseas en- 
ergy activities. This carries a risk. Just as China risks misperceiving U.S. inten- 
tions in managing global energy movements, such heightened attention may 
simply reinforce preconceived suspicions and may not necessarily produce a 
more productive understanding by energy and foreign policy officials of the 
two governments. 
Expedient assumptions and conclusions about the strategic rationale behind 
U.S. and Chinese energy policies are inaccurate and confining, and the risks 
of acting on  these inferences are high. The  challenge is to  prevent instinc- 
tive strategic rivalry and suspicion from prevailing to become the operational 
norm. 
The Common Interests Underlying Resource Competition 
Chinese-U.S. energy relations are full of ironies. For the past 30 years, China 
and the United States have in reality gained from each other’s energy poli- 
cies. China has benefited from the security that U.S. “hegemony” has wield- 
ed in stabilizing volatile spots of the  energy-producing world. Meanwhile, 
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ily in domestic economic and social develop- 
ment. Chinese public opinion, reflected in  
media reports and commentary, questions why 
consumer oil prices in China fail to change by 
the margins as world crude oil prices fluctu- 
ate. Yet, few appreciate the benefits that high 
oil prices can bring to controlling air pollution 
It oil prices were 
manipulated, any 
damage to China 
would also hurt the 
United States. 
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therefore, a significant part of managing energy security is effectively enabling 
demand for alternative energy sources in both countries to grow. 
The third irony is that because China and the United States have a high 
level of dependence on energy imports, particularly oil, they are exposed to 
the same risks of the international oil markets. As dependent consumers, 
China and the United States have to choose between political preference and 
market pragmatism when faced with an exporting country practicing resource 
nationalism.’6 An exporting government is in a prime position to exploit po- 
litical differences between a set of big powers by threatening to curtail exports 
to one and offering to divert them to another. 
A Proposal for Partnership 
There are differences between China and the United States, but it would be 
a waste of resources on both sides to encourage more competition or con- 
frontation. Both stand to lose from further complication or politicization of 
an already complex international energy system. The case for collaboration is 
easy when there is so much at stake. Collaboration on energy technology de- 
velopment and increasing oil extraction are two politically low-cost solutions 
to reduce tension between the United States and China. 
Competition is not the sole feature of government or government-endorsed 
interactions between China and the United States. Energy technology dcvel- 
opment in China was a key component when President Jimmy Carter signed a 
framework agreement of cooperation in science and technology with Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Since then, the cooperation framework has 
been strengthened to include an increasing number of government agencies 
and a multitude of scientific and business interests from both s~c ie t ies . ’~  In 
fact, the United States is the country with which China has launched the 
largest number of collaborative energy development programs and projects. 
These activities have in no small part contribu.ted to improvement in energy 
technology development in China. As a result of these government-sponsored 
projects, thousands of energy scientists and policy analysts regularly interact 
with each other across the Pacific. 
For more than a decade, Beijing and Washington also have made energy pol- 
icy an agenda item in governmental-level dialogues. Such vehicles include the 
US.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, the US.-China Oil and Gas Industry Fo- 
rum, the US.-China Economic Development and Reform Dialogue, the Peace- 
ful Uses of Nuclear Technologies Agreement, the Joint Coordinating Committee 
on Science and Technology, and the US.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. 
Still, the prevailing sentiment in both capitals is that China and the United 
States are parties for dialogue, at best, rather than partners in concerted action. 
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nology development. The  logic for doing so is 
simple: energy saved in  China means a n  in- 
crease in worldwide supply and a reduction of 
pollutants into the air, which migrate across 
the Pacific Ocean. T h e  areas for action in- 
clude working to  increase the use of nuclear 
and other  cleaner forms of power, improv- 
Confusion among 
bureaucracies lurks 
behind China’s 
prevailing sense of 
energy i n sec u r i ty. 
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Second, the governments of China and the United States ought to explore 
ways for their energy companies to jointly enlarge the global supply of oil and 
other forms of energy. Chinese oil companies are already collaborating with 
U.S. and other international oil companies through subcontracting arrange- 
ments. Serious competition between Chinese and U.S. companies as well as 
other international oil companies takes place 
when they pursue wholly owned or equity in- 
vestment in the same asset in a third country. The challenge is to I 
prevent instinctive 
strategic rivalry 
and suspicion from 
prevai I i ng. 
Chinese oil investment decisions baffle their 
US. competitors when profit margins are esti- 
mated to be considerably lower than those of 
other companies, raising suspicions of politi- 
cal motives. When Beijing and \Vashington are 
viewed as condoning such company behavior 
through dip 1 om ac y, they i nad v e r d e n t 1 y he 1 p 
strengthen the leverage of the third country, in- 
creasing the cost of extraction for all. Rather than providing cover for each 
other’s energy companies to compete in third-country markets, the two gov- 
ernments should find ways to encourage joint ventures in oil extraction. 
Chinese-U.S. joint ventures in oil development could help to lower the 
costs for oil companies associated with competitive bidding for the same en- 
ergy assets. They would also help dissuade the appeal of resource nationalism 
to oil-exporting states. This approach can certainly contribute to confidence 
building between the politicaI establishments in Beijing and Washington. 
Reinforcing Interdependence 
Energy security as a bilateral issue between China and the United States has the 
potential to become contentious. Although energy has little chance of being the 
issue that diffuses the myriad tensions between Beijing and \Vashington, energy 
cooperation in the spirit of partnership can help improve the status quo. 
Future government-level dialogue between Beijing and \Vashington on en- 
ergy should proceed beyond understanding each other’s policies and positions 
to partnership in the energy field. Such partnership should include strength- 
ening US. cooperation with China to improve the latter’s technological and 
administrative capacity in energy conservation and environmental protection. 
The two governments should also encourage their energy companies to launch 
joint ventures in oil extraction in other countries to lower the business and 
political costs of enlarging global supply. 
A pattern of interdependence has been built into bilateral relations be- 
tween the two countries. That interdependence manifests not just in com- 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 H
on
g K
on
g L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
0:2
5 2
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
4 
Promoting Encrgy Partnership in  Beijing and \Vashington I 
mercia l  tradc. The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and C h i n a ,  as the largest  and third- largest  
importers  of oil, respectively, must be able to count on effective energy conser- 
v a t i o n  i n  b o t h  societ ies  before t h e  h o p e s  for a less compet i t ive  in te rna t iona l  
energy market can be realistic. 
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